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3. FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS: 
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 
Raja Shehadeh 
The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International (1997), pp. 315 
Reviewed by Linda A. Malone' 
There is a pronounced and personal sadness in tone to Raja Shehadeh's book, From Occu-
pation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Mr. Shehadeh is a lawyer, 
human rights activist, the founder of Al-Haq, the West Bank affiliate of the International 
Commission of Jurists, and the author of Occupiers Law: Israel and the West Bank. He partic-
ipated in the Washington stages of the negotiations, which were subsequently eclipsed by the 
negotiations that occurred in Oslo. His book analyzes the context in which the Oslo Accords 
were negotiated, a critical contribution to a legal and political understanding of the accords 
that followed. It is his personal assessment of the prospects for meaningful implementation of 
the interim accords and, more broadly, the role oflaw in negotiations for Palestinian autono-
my, which will linger in the mind of any reader. 
The analysis focuses primarily on the Declaration of Principles of 1993 1 and the Interim 
Ag.r.eeIT}~ntof1995.2For introductOlY background he does, however, recount the history of 
Israeli settlements after 1967 with acknowledgment to the work of Meron Benvenisti. In 
Chapters I and II he presents a legal analysis of the two main agreements. The documents are 
so lengthy and so complex, the author can be excused for what at times seems a purely textual 
review of the key provisions. Chapter III provides a broader analysis of the legal and adminis-
trative changes which occurred after 1967 in Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. 
Chapters IV and V are unquestionably the core of the book and the most significant chap-
ters in terms of their contribution to the analytical literature in the field . Chapter IV chronicles 
the negotiations on the accords up to the. time of the secret negotiations in Oslo; and the final 
chapter examines the implementation legislation adopted by the Israeli legislature and the Pal-
estinian authority after the agreements. Neither chapter is intended to be a legalistic analysis 
ofthe accords under international law. These chapters are much more in the nature of a histor-
ical and political account of the progression and consolidation of Israeli control over the Pal-
estinian territories. 
Mr. Shehadeh's conclusion, from his own personal experience as well as his analysis of 
the documents and negotiations, is that the PLO made concessions and s4stained losses in the 
negotiations that are irreparable. He attributes these losses to the PLO's failure to comprehend 
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the Israeli strategy to use the negotiations to legitimize its control over the Palestinian territo-
ries rather than to truly negotiate, in good faith, a settlement acceptable to both parties. Unlike 
the PLO, Israel used every negotiation and legal instrument, from the Camp David Accords 
on, to strengthen its claims to legitimate control while supporting the settlements to make that 
control an irreversible reality. 
Perhaps even more disturbing is his conclusion that the law has no role to play in future 
negotiations over Palestinian autonomy. As a lawyer and human rights activist, Mr. Shehadeh 
relinquishes the role of legal advisor in any matter of Palestinian politics. He criticizes the 
Palestinian legal establishment for using international law inconsistently and always second-
arily to its political agenda. He asserts that wimting recognition for the PLO eclipsed all other 
considerations throughout all negotiations. As support for his position, he points out that the 
Palestinian negotiators at Oslo did not bring in their own legal team to negotiate with a vete-
ran team of Israeli jurists. With a sadness that is palpable, Mr. Shehadeh adopts his father's 
position which he had so assertively rejected in 1984 during the expansion of Israeli settle-
ments - that there was no hope left fOf Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories - rec-
ognizing that a younger generation of Palestinians will find his conclusion as unacceptable as 
he had once found his father's to be. 
The author's criticism of the Palestinian establishment itself does suggest a more optimis-
tic conclusion. If Israel has effectively utilized a legal strategy to consolidate its control, why 
not formulate and implement a legal strategy to obtain Palestinian autonomy? Mr. Shehadeh 
appears to reject this possibility on two grounds. First, Israel 's strategy has been effective and 
has reached a point of fruition which cannot be undone. Secondly, as an insider he seems to 
see no hope that the PLO would consider anything other than its own political interests in the 
decision-making process. If either assumption is correct, there is no cause for optimism. 
What subsequent conclusions at this point in time can be drawn from the deadlock in 
implementation of the accords? It may be simply that unforeseen events have brought to a halt 
the implementation of accords which the author found fatally flawed from the perspective of 
Palestinian autonomy. Alternatively, the deadlock in implementation of Palestinian autonomy 
may be confirmation of Mr. Shehadeh's conclusion, and that of his father: that the negotia-
tions were never meant by Israel to result in Palestinian autonomy, and that the PLO's short 
term political strategies will never bring about a long-term solution. 
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